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Abstract
Secret or private information may be leaked to an external attacker through the timing behaviour of the system running the
untrusted code. After introducing a formalisation of this situation in terms of a confinement property, we present an algorithm which
is able to transform the system into one that is computationally equivalent to the given system but free of timing leaks.
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1. Introduction
This paper concerns the transformation of programs to remove covert channels. Our focus is on timing channels,
which are able to signal information through the time at which an action occurs (a command is executed).
A system is vulnerable to a timing attack if there are alternative control flow paths of observably different duration;
a common refinement of this definition would be just to focus on those alternative paths where the selection is
guarded by confidential information. We will show that the comparison of different paths is essentially a confinement
problem. We have studied confinement in [1] using probabilistic bisimulation. Specifically, we showed that two
processes are probabilistically confined if and only if they share a common (probabilistic) abstract interpretation
(Proposition 39 of [1]). Our approach to probabilistic abstract interpretation is based on Operator Algebra and thus
abstractions are measurable by a norm; in particular, in [1], we showed how to measure the difference between two
processes and thus introduced the notion of approximate confinement. In [1] this measure, , was given a statisti-
cal interpretation which indicated how much work an attacker would have to perform in order to differentiate the
processes.
In this paper we use our previous work to identify the need for transformation. We identify the alternative paths
which fail to be bisimilar. These are then candidates for transformation. We present a transformation which establishes
probabilistic bisimilarity whilst retaining input/output equivalence with the original system. This transformation
involves the introduction of new “padded” control paths. This is similar to the approach of Agat [2]. However, in
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contrast to Agat, our work is not programming language specific; instead it is based on probabilistic transition systems
which provide a very general setting. The transformed system produced by our approach is more efficient than that
which would be produced by Agat’s algorithm. This is because our algorithm introduces less padding steps.
In the next section, we review some background material on probabilistic transition systems and their represen-
tation as linear operators. Section 3 reviews the pertinent results from [1] and shows how to use these results to
identify potential timing leaks. Section 4 and Section 6 present our algorithm for padding and its correctness. We
demonstrate the algorithm via a simple example in Section 5, and present some comparisons to related work in
Section 8.
2. Probabilistic processes
Probabilistic process algebras extend the well-established classical techniques for modelling and reasoning about
concurrent processes with the ability of dealing with non-functional aspects of process behaviour such as performance
and reliability, or in general the quantitative counterpart of classical properties representing the functional behaviour
of a system.
Several models for probabilistic processes have been proposed in the literature in recent years, which differ from
each other essentially in the “amount” of nondeterminism that is allowed in the model. Replacing nondeterministic
branching by a probabilistic one leads to either the reactive or the generative model introduced in [3], where the
probability distribution which guides the choice may depend (reactive) or not (generative) on the action labelling
the branches (or transitions). Other models allow for both nondeterministic and probabilistic branching and lead to a
myriad of variants depending on the interplay between the two kinds of branching (cf. [4]).
In order to describe the operational behaviour of probabilistic processes we consider probabilistic transition systems
(PTS’s), that is probabilistic extensions of the notion of labelled transition systems for classical process algebras.
Probabilistic transition systems essentially consist of a set of states and a set of labels, and their behaviour can be
informally described as follows: To a given action of the environment the system responds by either refusing it or
making a transition to a new state according to a probability distribution. In this paper we consider only PTS’s with a
finite number of states and actions, which reflect the generative model of probability; they effectively correspond to a
particular kind of probabilistic processes, namely finite Markov chains [5].
2.1. Probabilistic transition systems
Formally, we can define a probabilistic transition system in all generality as in [6]. We denote by Dist (X) the set
of all probability distributions on the set X, that is of all functions π : X → [0, 1], such that∑x∈X π(x) = 1.
Definition 1. A probabilistic transition system is a tuple (S,A,−→, π0), where:
• S is a non-empty, finite set of states,
• A is a non-empty, finite set of actions,
• −→ ⊆ S × A × Dist (S) is a transition relation, and
• π0 ∈ Dist (S) is an initial distribution on S.
For s ∈ S, α ∈ A and π ∈ Dist (S) we write s α−→ π for (s, α, π) ∈ −→. By s p:α−→ t we denote the transition
to individual states t with probability p = π(t). We denote the transition probability from a state s1 to a state s2
with label α by p(s1, α, s2). For a set of states C we write the accumulated transition probability from s1 to C as:
p(s1, α, C) =∑s∈C p(s1, α, s).
In the generative model the transition relation of a PTS (S,A,−→, π0) is a partial function −→: S ↪→ Dist(S × A);
this means that the same probability distribution is used to govern both the choice of the action and the (internal) state
transition. Looking at a PTS as a Markov chain, we can identify it with the tree of the outcomes of the associated
stochastic process; this can be seen as an experiment which takes place in stages. At each stage the probability for
each possible outcome is known when the outcomes of all previous stages are known, and the number of the possible
outcomes at each stage is finite. We can define the tree associated to a PTS inductively as follows.
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Definition 2. Let S be a non-empty, finite set of states, and let A be a non-empty finite set of actions. Then
• ({s}, A,∅, {〈s, 1〉}) is a tree-PTS with root s ∈ S;
• if Ti = (Si, A,−→i , {〈si, 1〉}), i = 1, . . . , m, m < ∞ are tree-PTS’s with roots si ∈ Si , Si ⊆ S for all i = 1, . . . , m,
Si ∩ Sj = ∅ for i /= j , s ∈ S \⋃i Si , and {〈(si, αi), pi〉 | si ∈ Si, αi ∈ A, i = 1, . . . , m} is a probability distribu-
tion, then the PTS constructed as ({s} ∪⋃i Si, A, {s pi :αi−→ si} ∪⋃ −→i , {〈s, 1〉}) is a tree-PTS with root s. We call
Ti the sub-trees of T .
When the transition probabilities form a sub-probability distribution, that is a function π : S × A → [0, 1] with∑
s∈S π(s) ≤ 1, then we call the PTS a subPTS (tree-subPTS).
2.2. Linear representation of probabilistic transition systems
As in previous work – e.g. [7,1] – we recast the common relational presentation of PTS’s in terms of linear maps
and operators in order to provide an appropriate mathematical framework for the quantitative study of probabilistic
processes.
Definition 3. Given a (sub)PTS T = (S,A,−→, π0) and a fixed α ∈ A then the matrix representing the probabilistic
transition relation α−→ ⊆ S × [0, 1] × S corresponding to α is given by
(M α−→)st =
{
p iff s p:α−→ t,
0 otherwise,
where s, t ∈ S, and (M)st denotes the entry in column s and row t in the matrix M. We define the matrix representation
M(T ) of the (sub)PTS P as the direct sum of the matrix representations of the transition relations α−→ for each α ∈ A:
M(T ) =
⊕
α∈A
M α−→.
We recall that for a set {Mi}ki=1 of ni × mi matrices, the direct sum of these matrices is defined by the (
∑k
i=1 ni) ×
(
∑k
i=1 mi) “diagonal” matrix:
M =
⊕
i
Mi = diag(M1, M2, . . . , Mk).
Given k square, n × n matrices Mi and an m × n matrix K then we use the shorthand notation K(⊕ki=1 Mi ) for the
matrix (
⊕k
i=1 K)(
⊕k
i=1 Mi ), where we apply K to each of the factors Mi .
For probabilistic (sub-probabilistic) relations we obtain a so-called stochastic (sub-stochastic) matrix, i.e. a positive
matrix where the entries in each row sum up to one (are less than or equal to one).
Matrices are not just schemes for writing down probabilities but also a way to specify linear maps or operators
between/on vector spaces. In our case, PTS’s are represented as operators on the vector spaceV(S) = { (vs)s∈S |vs ∈ R},
i.e. the set of formal linear combinations of elements in S with real coefficients. This space contains all distributions
of the state space Dist (S) ⊂ V(S).
3. Process equivalences and confinement
The problem of preventing a system from leaking private information to unauthorised users is essentially the problem
of guaranteeing the confinement [8] of the system against some specific attacks. Typically, after the introduction of the
notion of noninterference [9,10], most of the work on confinement has been based on models which ultimately depend
on some notion of process equivalence by identifying the absence of information flow between two processes via the
indistinguishability of their behaviours [11].
In [1] it is shown how various process equivalences can be approximated, and how probabilities can be used as
numerical information for quantifying such an approximation. This provides us with a quantitative measure of the
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indistinguishability of the process behaviour (according to the given semantics), that is in a security setting a measure
of their propensity to leak information. In particular, a notion of confinement can be obtained by stating that two
processes p and q are probabilistically confined iff they are probabilistic bisimilar.
The central aim of this paper is to present a transformation algorithm for PTS’s which constructs bisimilar PTS’s
while preserving the computational effects of the original systems. This section is devoted to a formal definition of
the two notions of process equivalence for PTS’s at the base of our treatment, namely probabilistic bisimulation and
probabilistic observables.
3.1. Probabilistic bisimulation
Probabilistic bisimilarity is the standard generalisation of process bisimilarity to probabilistic transition systems
and is due to [12].
Definition 4. A probabilistic bisimulation is an equivalence relation ∼b on the states of a probabilistic transition
system satisfying for all α ∈ A:
p ∼b q and p α−→ π ⇒ q α−→  and π ∼b .
Note that in the case of generative systems considered in this paper, π and  are sub-probability distributions.
The notion of probabilistic bisimulation on PTS corresponds to the notion of lumped process for finite Markov
chains [5]. This can be seen by noting that a probabilistic bisimulation equivalence ∼ on a PTS T = (S,A,→, π0)
defines a probabilistic abstract interpretation of T [1]. In fact, we have shown that it is always possible to define a
linear operator K from the space V(S) to the space V(S/∼) which represents ∼. This so-called classification operator
is represented by the n × m-matrix:
(K)ij =
{
1 if si ∈ Cj ,
0 otherwise,
with S/∼ = {C1, C2, . . . Cm} and n the cardinality of S. If M(T ) is the operator representation of T then K†M(T )K is
the abstract operator induced by K where K† is the so-called Moore–Penrose pseudo-inverse of K. For classification
operators K we can construct K† as the row-normalised transpose of K. Intuitively, K†M(T )K is an operator which
abstracts the original systemT by encoding only the transitions between equivalence classes instead of the ones between
single states. K determines a partition on the state space of T which is exactly the lumping of the states of T . This can
be formally deduced from the following theorem in [5].
Theorem 5. A necessary and sufficient condition for a Markov chain to be lumpable with respect to a partition
{C1, C2, . . . Cm} is that for every pair of sets Ci and Cj , the probabilities pkCj =
∑
t∈Cj pit of moving in one step
from state sk into set Cj have the same value for every sk ∈ Ci. These common values {p˜ij } form the transition matrix
for the lumped chain.
We can re-formulate the probabilistic bisimilarity of two processes A and B in terms of linear operators as follows,
cf. [1]:
Proposition 6. Given the operator representation M(A) and M(B) of two probabilistic processes A and B, then A
and B are probabilistic bisimilar, that is A ∼b B, iff there exist classification matrices KA and KB such that
K†AM(A)KA = K†BM(B)KB.
Probabilistic bisimilarity of A and B can be expressed in terms of Markov chains lumpability as follows:
Proposition 7. Given the operator representation M(A) and M(B) of two probabilistic processes A and B, then A
and B are probabilistic bisimilar iff there exists a lumping K of the process M(A) ⊕ M(B) of the form
K =
(
KA
KB
)
for some classification operators KA and KB for A and B such that KA and KB are fully column-ranked.
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For tree-PTS the above result essentially means that an equivalence relation on the union of the states of two
processes A and B is a probabilistic bisimulation for A and B iff their roots belong to the same equivalence class.
Probabilistic bisimulation is the finest of all process equivalences as it identifies processes whose step-wise behaviour
is exactly the same. From an external viewpoint other behaviours can be observed in order to distinguish two processes.
In particular, a potential attacker may be able to obtain experimentally two kinds of information about a process by
observing what final outcomes the process produces, and by measuring how long the process is running. Both the
input/output behaviour and the timing behaviour of a process correspond to some suitable abstractions of the concrete
behaviour of the process in question. In this paper we will concentrate on these observables and show how we can
transform a process (PTS) in a way that its input/output behaviour is preserved, while its timing behaviour changes so
as to become indistinguishable from another given process.
3.2. Probabilistic observables
In our PTS model, any execution of a process leads to a single trace, i.e. a single execution path. Each time there
is a probabilistic choice, one of the possible branches is chosen with some probability. The combined effect of all
the choices made defines the probability of a particular path as the product of probabilities along this computational
path. For finite processes we only have to consider finitely many paths of finite length and thus only need a basic
probability model. This is based on a finite set of events , i.e. all possible traces, such that all sets of traces have a
well-defined probability attached, i.e. are measurable, and the probability function P : P() → [0, 1] can be defined
via a distribution, i.e. a function π :  → [0, 1] such that P(X) =∑x∈X π(x) for all X ⊆ .
The notion of observables we will consider is based on a trace semantics for probabilistic processes whose intuition
and formal definition are given below.
3.2.1. Trace semantics
Formally, the trace semantics of a process T is defined via the notion of probabilistic result of a computational path.
Definition 8. For a computational path π = s0 p1:α1−→ s1 p2:α2−→ · · · pn:αn−→ sn, we define its probabilistic result R(π) as
the pair 〈α1α2 . . . αn, prob(π)〉, where prob(π) =∏i pi . The trace associated to π is t (π) = α1α2 . . . αn.
Since different computational paths may have the same associated trace (cf. Example 9), we need to sum up the
probabilities associated to each such computational path in order to appropriately define a probabilistic result. Formally,
this can be done by defining for a process T and trace t the set
[π ]T ,t = {π | π a computational path for T and t (π) = t},
which collects all the computational paths with trace t . Then we define for each trace t the computational result
R([π ]T ,t ) as the pair
〈
t,
∑
π∈[π ]T ,t prob(π)
〉
.
We can now define the trace semantics of T as the set
S(T ) = {R([π ]T ,t ) | t = t (π) and π is a computational path for T }.
Example 9. Consider the following simple processes with action A = {a, b, e}:
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It is easy to see that the possible traces for the first two processes are given by the sequence ab while for process T3
we have the traces abe and aeb and for process T4 we have aeb and ab.
We can thus describe the trace semantics of these four processes by:
S(T1)={〈ab, 1〉}
S(T2)={〈ab, 1〉}
S(T3)={〈abe, 0.5〉 , 〈aeb, 0.5〉}
S(T4)={〈aeb, 0.5〉 , 〈ab, 0.5〉}
3.2.2. I/O observables
The notion of input/output observables, which we will refer to as I/O observables from now on, correspond to the
most abstract observation of a process behaviour as it just considers the final result of an execution. In our setting, these
final results are identified with probability distributions over the set of all possible abstract traces. Abstract traces are
defined in terms of a function [[.]] which allows us to avoid specifying a concrete semantics for the labels, thus keeping
our approach as general as possible. In fact, in a PTS we can think of labels as some kind of “instructions” which
are performed by the process, e.g. a = “x := x-1”, b = “x := 2*x”, etc. The final result of an execution is thus
the accumulated effect of executing these instructions. Depending on the specific application, the function [[.]] will be
defined so as to abstract from the appropriate computational details of the concrete traces.
For our purposes, we can leave the actual nature of [[.]] unspecified and only assume that there is a neutral instruction
e, i.e. a label which represents something like a skip statement, such that for any trace t1t2 . . . tn we have:
[[t1t2 . . . tn]] ≡ [[t1t2 . . . tieti+1tn]],
i.e. putting e anywhere in the execution (including at the end or the beginning) does not change the computational
result. We will identify traces if the only difference between them are some occurrences of this neutral label e; this
introduces an equivalence relation ≡ on the set of all traces.
Clearly, different concrete traces might be identified by [[.]]; for example, if a = “x := x+1” and b = “x := x-1”
one would usually have [[ab]] = [[e]] = [[ba]].
Definition 10. Given a tree-PTS T , we define its I/O observables as
O(T ) = {R([π ]T ,[[t]]) | π is a computational path for T }.
Proposition 11. For any tree-PTS T , its I/O observables O(T ) define a probability distribution on the set of states S.
Proof. By induction on the tree structure of T .
• If T = ({s}, A,∅, {〈s, 1〉}) then O(T ) is obviously a probability distribution on S.
• If T = ({s} ∪⋃i Si, A, {s pi :αi−→ si} ∪⋃ −→i , {〈s, 1〉}), then by the inductive hypothesis we have for all i = 1, . . . ,
m that O(Ti) is a probability distribution on Si . Therefore, O(T ) =∑mi=1 pi ·O(Ti) is a probability distribution
on
⋃
i Si . 
Based on this notion of I/O observables we can now define when two processes are I/O equivalent.
Definition 12. Two tree-PTS’s A and B are I/O equivalent, denoted by A ∼io B, if they define the same probability
distribution on the set of the equivalence classes of abstract traces, i.e. iff O(A) = O(B).
Example 13. If we consider again the four processes from Example 9, we get the following I/O observables:
O(T1)={〈[[ab]], 1〉},
O(T2)={〈[[ab]], 1〉},
O(T3)={〈[[abe]], 0.5〉 , 〈[[aeb]], 0.5〉} = {〈[[ab]], 1〉},
O(T4)={〈[[aeb]], 0.5〉 , 〈[[ab]], 0.5〉} = {〈[[ab]], 1〉},
i.e. all four processes are I/O equivalent.
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3.3. Timing behaviour
An external observer may have the ability to measure the time a process needs to perform a given task. In order to
do so she just needs to observe “execution times”, while the concrete nature of the performed instruction is irrelevant
for her purposes. In our model, the timing behaviour of a process can therefore be defined by abstracting from labels
(instructions) and assuming that there is a function |.| from labels to real numbers which measures the time it takes to
execute the instruction represented by the label.
One can think of various choices for the timing function. For example, one can assume (as in [13]) that there is only
one special label t with |t | = 1 which indicates time progress, while all other labels take no execution time; in this
case the time flow is measured by the number of these special labels occurring in a trace. Alternatively, one can assign
a different duration to each label. In our model we assume that all labels need a strictly positive time to be executed,
i.e. |α| > 0 for all labels, and that the execution time of all labels is the same. In particular, while in general one could
have various neutral labels e with different executions time, e.g. |e0| = 0, |e1| = 1, …, we will assume that there is
only one neutral element, denoted by
√
, which consumes exactly one time unit.
Formally, we define the time semantics of our processes in terms of the notion of time bisimulation, that is a
bisimulation relation on PTS’s where transitions are labelled only by action
√
.
Definition 14. Given a tree-PTS T = (S,A,−→, π0), we define its depleted or ticked version Tˆ as the PTS (S′, A′,
−→′, π ′0) with S′ = S, A′ = {
√}, π ′0 = π0, and −→′ defined by
(s,
√
, π) ∈−→′ iff (s, α, π) ∈−→ for some α ∈ A.
Time bisimilarity is defined as a probabilistic bisimilarity (cf. Definition 4) for depleted versions of PTS.
Definition 15. Given two PTS’s A and B, we say that A and B are time bisimilar, denoted by A ∼tb B, iff there is a
probabilistic bisimulation on the states of the ticked versions of A and B.
Example 16. The following two processes P1 and P2 are not probabilistic bisimilar; they are nevertheless time
bisimilar as one can easily see by considering their ticked versions Pˆ1 and Pˆ2:
On the other hand it is easy to see that two deterministic processes, i.e. processes which correspond to a single trace,
are time bisimilar if and only if they have the same length, as the following example illustrates:
3.4. Timing leaks
Our model for timing leaks essentially follows the noninterference based approach to confinement recalled at the
beginning of this section. In particular, we define timing attacks in terms of the ability of distinguishing the timing
behaviour of two processes expressed via the notion of time bisimilarity.
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In [1] we have used the same idea to model probabilistic covert channels. The notion of process equivalence used
in that paper is an approximate version of probabilistic bisimilarity as the purpose there is to provide an estimate of the
confinement of the system, rather than just checking whether it is confined or not. We aim to extending this current work
toward a similar direction (cf. Section 8). To this purpose, the linear representation of PTS, i.e. their correspondence
with processes which are Markov chains, is essential; in fact, as shown in [1], it provides the necessary quantitative
framework for defining numerical estimates.
Definition 17. We say that two processes T1 and T2 are confined against timing attacks or time confined iff their
associated PTS are time bisimilar.
We can re-formulate this definition of timing leaks in terms of lumping as done in Proposition 6 for probabilistic
bisimilarity. This will be the base for the definition of the transformation technique we will present in Section 4.
Definition 18. Given the operator representation M(T ) =⊕α∈A Mα(T ) of a probabilistic process T then the linear
representation of its ticked version is given by:
M̂(T ) =
∑
α∈A
Mα(T ).
Definition 19. We say that A and B are time bisimilar, A ∼tb B, iff there exist classification matrices KA and KB ,
such that
K†AM̂(A)KA = K†BM̂(B)KB.
In the following we present a technique for closing possible covert timing channels by transforming the system
into an equivalent one which is free from timing leaks. The transformation algorithm we present is applicable to finite
tree-PTS’s. It uses ideas from the optimal lumping algorithm in [14] and the padding techniques from [2].
Intuitively, given a system formed by processes A and B, the algorithm is based on the construction of a lumping
for the Markov chain formed by the direct sum of the two Markov chains representing A and B. By Proposition 7, the
resulting lumped process will be a probabilistic bisimulation for A and B iff the root nodes of A and B belong to the
same class (or they are essentially the same state in the lumped process). In this case no transformation is needed as
the two processes are confined against timing attacks; otherwise the algorithm produces two new processes A′ and B ′
which exhibit the same I/O behaviour as A and B but are also time confined. The following diagram shows the effect
of the transformation.
4. Transforming probabilistic transition systems
Checking whether two systems are bisimilar or not, aka the bisimulation problem in the literature, is important not
only in concurrency theory but also in many other fields such as verification and model checking, where bisimulation
is used to minimise the states space, but also in computer security where many non-interference properties can be
specified in terms of bisimulation equivalence [15,1]. Various algorithms have been proposed which solve this problem
in linear time, the most important one being the algorithm proposed by Paige and Tarjan in [16]. This algorithm has
been adapted in [14] for probabilistic processes; in particular, the Derisavi et al. algorithm constructs the optimal
lumping quotient of a finite Markov chain in linear time, and can then be used to check the probabilistic bisimilarity
of two PTS’s.
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In this paper we take a transformational approach: we not only check whether two probabilistic processes are
bisimilar or not, but in the case where the processes are not bisimilar then we transform them into two bisimilar ones.
The transformation we propose is inspired by the Derisavi et al. algorithm but does not aim to construct an “optimal”
partition in the sense of [16]. It rather aims to add missing states and adjust the transition probabilities when it is needed
to make two given processes bisimilar. It also preserves the probabilistic observable of the original processes.
The algorithm we present consists in essentially two intertwined procedures: one constructs a lumping partition
for the PTS union of two tree-PTS’s; the other “fixes” the partition constructed by the lumping procedure if some
properties are violated which guarantee the partition to be a probabilistic bisimulation for the given processes. Fixing
corresponds to adding some missing states (padding) and adjusting the transition probabilities in order to achieve
bisimilarity. Moreover, the transformation is performed in a way that the original I/O observables of the processes is
preserved. The overall procedure is repeated until a partition is constructed which effectively makes the two processes
probabilistically bisimilar.
Before embarking on a more detailed description of our algorithm, we introduce some necessary notions and
definitions. In the rest of this paper we focus on finite tree-structured PTS.
For a PTS (S,A,−→, π0) we will consider partitions P = {B1, . . . , Bn} of S; we will refer to the Bi’s as the blocks
of the partition P . Given a state s ∈ S and a partition P we define the cumulative probability of s with respect to B ∈ P
as p(s, B) =∑{q | s q−→ t with t ∈ B}. We further define the backward image for a block B and a probability q as
preq,−→(B) = {s | ∃B ′ ⊆ B : p(s, B ′) = q}; this corresponds to the set of all states from which B (i.e a state in B)
can be reached with probability q. We will often omit the index −→ when it is clear from the context.
For a tree-PTS T we will refer to Height(T ) as the maximal length of a path in T from the root to a terminal
state. The n layer cut-off of a tree-PTS T is defined inductively as (i) the set of terminal nodes for n = 0, and (ii) for
n = i + 1 the set of nodes with only direct links (paths of length one) to nodes in the i layer cut-off. The procedure
CutOff(T , n) returns the n layer cut-off of T which we also denote by T |n. The complement of the n layer cut-off is
sometimes called the n layer top and the top nodes in the n layer cut-off form the n layer.
Auxiliary procedures
An important feature of the transformation of PTS’s we present in the following is the creation of new states.
These will be copies of existing states or of a distinguished additional “dummy state” d. We will denote copies of
a given state s by s′, s′′, s′′′, . . .. For copies of the dummy state we usually will omit the primes. For a tree-PTS
T = (S,A,−→, {〈r, 1〉}) we define its copy as the tree-PTS T ′ = (S′, A,−→′, {〈r ′, 1〉}) with S′ = {s′ | s ∈ S} and
s′ p:α−→′ t ′ iff s p:α−→ t .
In the main algorithm we assume a routine CopyTree(T , s) which returns a copy of the sub-tree of a tree-PTS T
which is rooted in state s (where s is a state in T ). We will also use a routine DepleteTree(T , s) which takes a tree-PTS
T and returns Tˇ , i.e. a copy of T where all states are replaced by copies of the dummy state d and all transitions are
labelled by
√
.
Another auxiliary procedure is Linking(T1, s, α, p, T2) whose effect is to introduce a (copy) of a tree-PTS T1 into an
existing tree-PTS T2 at state s; the linking transition will be labelled by α and the associated transition probability will
be p. A related procedure called Joining(T1, s, p, T2) introduces a (copy) of a tree-PTS T2 into an existing tree-PTS
T1 at state s by identifying the root of T1 with s and by multiplying initial transitions with probability p.
Lumping
As already mentioned, our algorithm is inspired by the Paige–Tarjan algorithm for constructing bisimulation
equivalences [16], i.e. stable partitions, for a given transition system. The same ideas can be used for probabilistic
transition relations p−→; in this case we say that a partition P = {B1, . . . , Bn} of a set of states is stable with respect
to
p−→ iff for all blocks Bi and Bj in P and probability q we have that preq(Bi) ∩ Bj = ∅ or Bj ⊆ preq(Bi).
The construction of the lumping partition is done via the refinement of an initial partition which identifies all states
in one class and proceeds as in the algorithm Lumping (cf. Algorithm 1). Starting with the initial partition P = {S} the
algorithm incrementally refines it by a splitting procedure. For a block Bi the splitting procedure Splitting(Bi, P )
refines the current partition P by replacing each block Bj ∈ P with prep(Bi) ∩ Bj /= ∅ for some probability p by the
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Algorithm 1. Lumping Algorithm
1: procedure Lumping(T )
2: Assume: T is a tree-PTS
3: P ← {S}
4: while ¬Stable(P, T ) do
5: choose B ∈ P
6: P ← Splitting(B, P )
7: end while
8: end procedure
Algorithm 2. Maximal Lumping Algorithm
1: procedure MaxLumping(T1, T2)
2: Assume: T1 = (S1, A,−→, {〈r1, 1〉}) is a tree-PTS
3: Assume: T2 = (S2, A,−→, {〈r2, 1〉}) is a tree-PTS
4: n ← 0  Base Case
5: P ← {S1 ∪ S2}  Partition
6: S ← {S1 ∪ S2}  Splitters
7: while n ≤ Height(T1 ⊕ T2) do
8: T T ← CutOff(T1 ⊕ T2, n)  n layer cut off
9: P ← {B ∩ T T | B ∈ P }  Partition below current layer
10: S ← P ∪ {(S1 ∪ S2) \ T T }  Splitters (below and top)
11: while S /= ∅ do
12: choose B ∈ S, S ← S \ B  Choose a splitter
13: P ← Splitting(B, P )  Split (current layer)
14: C ← {B ∈ P | B ∩ S1 = ∅ ∨ B ∩ S2 = ∅}  Critical class(es)
15: if C /= ∅ then
16: return C  Found critical class(es)
17: end if
18: end while
19: n ← n + 1  Go to next level
20: end while
21: return C
22: end procedure
new blocks prep(Bi) ∩ Bj and Bj \ prep(Bi). The block Bi is called a splitter. We will also assume the definition of
a procedure Stable(P, T ) which returns true iff partition P is stable for PTS T .
In order to construct a time bisimulation ∼tb for two tree-PTS’s T1 and T2 we apply a slightly modified lumping
procedure (cf Algorithm 2) to the union PTS T = T1 ⊕ T2. The procedure MaxLumping(T1, T2) takes two tree-PTS’s
T1 = (S1, A,−→, {〈r1, 1〉}) and T2 = (S2, A,−→, {〈r2, 1〉}) and tries to construct a time bisimulation for T1 and T2
by lumping T .
At each step the procedure constructs a partition P = {B1, B2, . . . , Bm} of the set S1 ∪ S2 and identifies a set of
critical blocks C = {C1, . . . Ck} ⊆ P . A critical block Cj is an equivalence class which has representatives in only one
of the two PTS’s, i.e. such that Cj ∩ S1 = ∅ or Cj ∩ S2 = ∅. The procedure works on“layers”, i.e. at each iteration
MaxLumping(T1, T2) partitions the nodes in layer n by choosing a splitter among the blocks in the n layer cut-off; it
moves on to the next layer only when all such blocks have been considered.
Padding
The padding procedure identifies the critical blocks by calling the procedure MaxLumping(T1, T2) and then
transforms the two processes T1 and T2 in order to “fix” the transitions to the critical blocks. The transformation
is performed by the procedure FixIt which we will describe later. In the special case where the critical blocks do not
contain any representative of either of the two processes, say T1, the fixing consists in padding T1 with a depleted
sub-tree formed by its root only which is a dummy state. This is linked to the root of T1 via a ticked transition with
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Algorithm 3. Padding Algorithm
1: procedure Padding(T1, T2)
2: C ←MaxLumping(T1, T2)  identify critical classes
3: repeat
4: if C = {Ci}i with Ci ∩ S1 = ∅, ∀Ci then
5: D ← ({d}, {√},∅, {〈d, 1〉})
6: T1 ← Linking(D, d,√, 1, T1)
7: else if C = {Ci}i with ∀Ci : Ci ∩ S2 = ∅ then
8: D ← ({d}, {√},∅, {〈d, 1〉})
9: T2 ← LinkingD, d,√, 1, T2
10: else if C = {Ci}i with Cj ⊆ S1 /= ∅ /= Ck ⊆ S2 then
11: choose s1 ∈ Ck
12: choose s2 ∈ Cj
13: FixIt(T1, s1, T2, s2)
14: end if
15: C ←MaxLumping(T1, T2)
16: until C = ∅  i.e. T1 ∼tb T2
17: return T1, T2
18: end procedure
probability 1 by the Linking procedure. In the general (more symmetric) case where some of the critical blocks contain
only states from one process and some other critical blocks only states from the other process the transformation is
made by the FixIt procedure.
When among the critical blocks of the current partition there is at least one block Ck which contains only repre-
sentatives of T1 and one block Cj which contains only representatives of T2, the fixing is more elaborate and involves
both processes. In this case there must exist states s1 ∈ Ck and s2 ∈ Cj with different probabilities of reaching some
other blocks Bi of the partition. The FixIt procedure selects two blocks Bk and Bl in previous layer such that the
probabilities p1k, p1l of the transitions from s1 to Bk and Bl and the probabilities p2k, p2l of the transitions from s2 to
Bk and Bl are such that p1k > p2k and p1l < p2l . This choice is always possible. In fact, the sum of all probabilities
from s1 and s2 to other classes sum up to one, i.e.
∑
i p1i = 1 =
∑
i p2i where i covers all classes Bi reachable from
s1 or s2. As s1 and s2 are in different (critical) blocks the probabilities must differ for at least one class Bi , i.e. there
exists at least one index k with p1k /= p2k; thus we have that either p1k > p2k or p1k < p2k . Without loss of generality,
let p1k > p2k , i.e. we found the class Bk as required. We now have
∑
i /=k p1i + p1k = 1 =
∑
i /=k p2i + p2k and thus∑
i /=k p1i <
∑
i /=k p2i . As the summation is over the same number of probabilities, i.e. positive numbers, there must
be at least one summand in
∑
i /=k p2i such that p2l > p1l .
After that, FixIt selects four states t1k ∈ Bk ∩ S1, t2k ∈ Bk ∩ S2, t1l ∈ Bl ∩ S1, and t2l ∈ Bl ∩ S2 with s1 q1k−→ t1k ,
s1
q1l−→ t1l , s2 q2k−→ t2k , and s2 q2l−→ t2l and the corresponding sub-trees T1k, T1l , T2k and T2l which are rooted in
t1k, t1l , t2k and t2l . Note that since Bk and Bl are in the n − 1 layer cut-off they are not critical blocks, thus it is
always possible to find such state. The probabilities q1l and q2k stay unchanged but q1k and q2l will be decreased by
the maximal possible amount. Ideally, this decrement should be rk and rl , but if q1k and q2l are smaller than rk and rl
we only reduce q1k and q2l to zero, i.e. effectively we remove the corresponding sub-trees.
The states s1 and s2 now have the same probabilities to reach the classes Bl and Bk , i.e. have become bisimilar.
However, this transformations has two flaws: (i) the system is no longer a PTS as the probabilities from s1 and s2 no
longer add up to one, (ii) the probabilities on the terminal states reachable in T1k and T2l are reduced. In order to fix
this we have to construct “compensating trees” which are bisimilar and which reproduce the missing probabilities for
the outputs. These two trees are constructed via calling Padding on a copy of T1k and a depleted version of T1l , and
a copy of T2l and a depleted version of T2k , respectively. Finally, these “compensating trees” are linked to s1 and s2
with a
√
label and the missing probabilities r1k and r2l .
This way we obtain again a proper tree-PTS with normalised probability distributions for s1 and s2. Furthermore,
the“compensating trees” produce exactly the same output as T1k and T2l , thus the resulting PTS’s have the same overall
output as the original ones. Finally, by construction the compensating trees are bisimilar as T1k and T2k are bisimilar;
the same holds for T1l and T2l .
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Algorithm 4. Fixing Algorithm
1: procedure FixIt(T1, s1, T2, s2)
2: for all Bi blocks do  determine all possible changes
3: Assume: s1
p1i−→ Bi and s2 p2i−→ Bi
4: p′i ← min(p1i , p2i )
5: end for
6: Assume: Bk is such that p′k = p2k
7: Assume: Bl is such that p′l = p1l
8: rk ← p1k − p′k
9: rl ← p2l − p′l
10: choose t1k ∈ Bk ∩ S1 and T1k sub-tree starting with s1 1−→ t1k
11: choose t2k ∈ Bk ∩ S2 and T2k sub-tree starting with s1 1−→ t2k
12: choose t1l ∈ Bl ∩ S1 and T1l sub-tree starting with s2 1−→ t1l
13: choose t2l ∈ Bl ∩ S2 and T2l sub-tree starting with s2 1−→ t2l
14:  make maximal possible changes of probabilities
15: Assume: s1
q1k−→ t1k , s1 q1l−→ t1l , s2 q2k−→ t2k , and s2 q2l−→ t2l
16: r1k ← min(q1k, rk)
17: q1k ← (q1k − r1k)
18: r2l ← min(q2l , rl)
19: q2l ← (q2l − r2l )
20:  construct and link up “compensating” subtrees
21: X1kl, Y
1
kl ← Padding(T1k, Tˆ1l )
22: X2kl, Y
2
kl ← Padding(Tˆ2k, T2l )
23: Joining(T1, s1, r1k, X1kl)
24: Joining(T2, s2, r2l , Y 2kl)
25: end procedure
5. A simple example
Consider two processes A and B (with p /= q and p, q ∈ {0, 1}) defined as:
The aim is to construct two processes A′ and B ′ such that A′ ∼tb B ′ and A ∼io A′ and B ∼io B ′. Note that A and B
do not have the same I/O observables, i.e. A ∼io B, and that we also do not require this for the transformed processes.
If we call MaxLumping(A,B) we have as first splitter the set of all states, i.e. S1 = {1, 2, . . . , 8}. The backward
image of S1, i.e. calling Splitting(S1, {S1}), allows us to distinguish the terminal nodes from ‘internal’ nodes, i.e.
we get the partition K1 = {{2, 4, 6, 8}, {1, 3, 5, 7}}. Obviously, both processes have representatives in each of the two
blocks of this partition.
If we continue lumping using the splitter S2 = {2, 4, 6, 8}, i.e. the terminal nodes, we get a refined partition K2 =
{{2, 4, 6, 8}, {3, 7}, {1}, {5}}. The probability of reaching S2 from nodes 3 and 7 is the same (namely 1) while 1 and 5
reach the terminal nodes with different probabilities (namely p and q) and thus form two separate blocks.
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The splitting K2 now is not properly balanced, i.e. the class {1} has no representatives in B and {5} has no
representatives in A. MaxLumping(A,B) will thus report {1} and {5} as critical classes.
In order to fix the ‘imbalance’ between A and B we have to do two things: (i) minimising/unifying the probabilities
of transitions emitting from 1 and 5, and (ii) introducing subtrees X and Y to compensate for the missing outputs and
to re-establish normalised probabilities.
• The first step thus is to transform A and B into the following form:
These two transformed versions of A and B are now probabilistically tick bisimilar but unfortunately they have
different outputs, i.e. they are not I/O equivalent; moreover they fail to fulfill the normalisation condition for PTS
and Markov chains.
• To compensate for the “missing” probability r = 1 − min(p, q) − min(1 − p, 1 − q) we have to construct subtrees
X and Y which reproduce the missing output states and which are bisimilar. As we have a critical class, namely
Ck = {1} ∈ A and Cj = {5} ∈ B, in each process we have to consider the third case (line 10) in Padding. As the
critical classes are singletons we have to take s1 = 1 and s2 = 5 in when we call FixIt(A, 1, B, 5).
There are now for each of the states s1 = 1 and s2 = 5 two blocks they can make a move to, namely Bk = {3, 7} and
Bl = {2, 4, 6, 8}, but with different probabilities. We have now to chose in FixIt (lines 10–13) representative states
for these two blocks in each of the two processes A and B. In our example these states are uniquely determined,
t1k = 3, t1l = 2, t2k = 7, and t2l = 6. Furthermore, we have to consider the following sub-trees of A and B which
are rooted in these representative states:
We assume w.l.o.g. p > q, i.e. min(p, q) = q and min(1 − p, 1 − q) = 1 − p (the other case is symmetric) and
thus r1k = r2l = p − q. The compensation tree X1kl for A thus must fulfill X1kl ∼io T1l and for Y 2kl in B we have
Y 2kl ∼io T2k and furthermore X1kl ∼tb Y 2kl . In order to construct X1kl and Y 2kl we thus just have to call (recursively)
Padding(T1k, Tˆ1l ) and Padding(Tˆ2k, T2l ).
We therefore have to compare twice two trees in order to obtain a padded version (calling Padding recursively):
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A dotted transition denotes a ticked or depleted transition: it means that no computation takes place during this
transition (i.e. the state does not change) only time passes. Empty nodes ◦ denote copies of the dummy state: they
can be seen as place-holders that inherit the state from the previous node. Obviously these two sub-trees X1kl and
Y 2kl fulfill the needed requirements regarding bisimilarity and I/O equivalence.• Finally we have to introduce these compensatory sub-trees into the transformed versions of A and B to obtain (with
r = 1 − min(p, q) − min(1 − p, 1 − q)):
6. Correctness of padding
In order to show that Padding(T1, T2) indeed produces PTS’s T ′1 and T ′2 which are (i) I/O-equivalent to T1 and T2
respectively, and (ii) time bisimilar, we first describe the effect of various operations performed in Padding on the
observables and (non)bisimilar states.
Given two states s1 and s2 in two tree-subPTS’s T1 and T2 respectively and a bisimulation relation ∼ on the union
T = T1 ⊕ T2, we define new subPTS’s T mins1 and T mins2 as a common minimisation of the transition probabilities of s1
and s2 by changing the transition probabilities from each of the two states to any class Ck of the bisimulation relation
∼ and all labels α as follows:
p′(s1, α, Ck) = min(p(s1, α, Ck), p(s2, α, Ck)),
p′(s2, α, Ck) = min(p(s1, α, Ck), p(s2, α, Ck)),
p′(si, α, sj ) = p(si, α, sj ) for i ∈ {1, 2},
where p(·) denotes the probabilities in T and p′(·) the probabilities in T minsj , j = 1, 2.
Note that, since it is possible to change the accumulated probabilities p(s, α, C) from states to classes in various
ways by adjusting the state-to-state probabilities p(s, α, s′), the common minimisation is not unique.
Lemma 20. Given a state s1 in T1 and a state s2 in T2 and a bisimulation relation ∼ on T = T1 ⊕ T2, then the common
minimisation T mins1 and T
min
s2 are such that s1 ∼ s2.
Proof. This follows directly from the definition of p′(·). 
Consider two tree-subPTS’s, T and S, and a state t in T . The insertion of S into T at t with probability q and label
λ is the tree-subPTS T tq:λ S with
p′(ti , α, tj ) = p(ti, α, tj ) for ti , tj ∈ T and all labels α,
p′(sk, α, sl) = p(sk, α, sl) for si, sj ∈ S and all labels α,
p′(t, λ, s0) = q,
where s0 is the root of S, p(·) denotes the probabilities in T and S, and p′(·) the probabilities in T tq:α S.
A special case of insertion is the extension of a tree with a dummy state r , which is used in the padding algorithm
to deal with the case of a critical block whose intersection with one of the two tree-PTS’s is empty. In this case, T2 is
the degenerated tree with the new state r as the only state, and the label on the transition from r to S2 is λ = e. The
resulting tree-PTS, r t01:e S, where t0 is the root of S, is in this case time bisimilar (but in general not bisimilar) to
T1 t1q:λ S1.
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The insertion of sub-trees changes the observables as follows.
Lemma 21. Given two tree-subPTS’s, T and S, and a state t in T , let O(T ) and O(S) be the observables of T and S
and π0 be the (unique) path from the root of T to t . Then the insertion of S into T with probability p on action α has
the following observables:
O(T tp:α S) = O(T ) + p (π0α ·O(S)),
i.e. the observables O(T ) of T plus the “p-weighted” paths in π0α ·O(S).
As a special case, for the extension of a tree with a dummy state O(r t01:e S), we have:
O(r t01:e S) = O(r) + 1 (e ·O(S)) = O(S),
i.e. the original observables are not changed.
Let T be a tree-subPTS and let S be a sub-tree-subPTS of T . Then the partial deletion of S in T , denoted by T p
p′ S,
is the tree-subPTS on the states of T obtained by changing the entry probability into S from T , i.e. the probability with
which the root of S can be reached from T \ S, from p to p′. For p′ = 0, this operation corresponds to the deletion of
S in T .
The (partial) deletion of a sub-tree changes the observables as follows.
Lemma 22. Given a tree-subPTS T and a sub-tree-subPTS S of T with observables O(T ) and O(S) respectively,
and a (unique) path π0 from the root of T to the root of S, then the observables of T pp′ S are given by:
O(T p
p′ S) = O(T ) − (p − p′)(π0 ·O(S)).
Proof. Each path reaching a leaf through S is not completely removed but only its impact on the observables is reduced.
In T the probability is a product of the form
∏
k pk · p ·
∏
l pl where the pk indicate the computational steps in π0,
the probability p is the original entry probability into S, and pl are the probabilities in S. In T pp′ S the probability of
this path is changed to:
∏
k pk · p′ ·
∏
l pl . If we therefore remove the contribution of these paths in the original
observables and add the contribution in the new subPTS we obtain the desired result: O(T p
p′ S) = O(T ) − pπ0 ·
O(S) + p′π0 ·O(S) = O(T ) − (p − p′)π0 ·O(S). If p′ = 0 then the subtree S is effectively eliminated and
so are all the paths through S to the leaves. As the observables are distributions over paths we simply have to
eliminate the contribution of these paths through S from the observables of T . The contribution of these paths is
not just their “S-stage” but has to be prefixed by the contribution until S, i.e. its root, is reached; this is given by the
unique path π0. 
We can now show the main theorem establishing that the padding is correct.
Theorem 23. Given two tree-PTS’s T1 and T2 then Padding(T1, T2) returns the tree-PTS’s T ′1 and T ′2 such that
T ′1 ∼tb T ′2, T ′1 ∼io T1, and T ′2 ∼io T2.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the layers in the union T1 ⊕ T2. We assume that k is the number of layers, i.e.
k = max{Height(T1),Height(T2)}. We will use the notation T ni , i = 1, 2, to indicate the n-stage transformation of
Ti : this is the tree-PTS formed by the n layer top of Ti and the n layer cut-off of T ′i , that is an intermediate version of Ti
and T ′i where the n bottom layers are already padded but the top still needs to be fixed. Thus, T ′1 = T k1 and T ′2 = T k2 .
We will also use the notation s  T to indicate that the state s has a transition to some classes of the partition T on
some action with some probability.
The algorithm Padding progresses through the trees T1 and T2 layer by layer starting from the terminal states
or leaves (base case). The sub-routine MaxLumping tries to identify non-bisimilar states in T1 and T2. When the
procedure enters the layer n + 1 then the n-cutoffs are time bisimilar, i.e. T1|n ∼tb T2|n (induction hypothesis).
Moreover, we will show that at each layer n, T n1 ∼io T1, and T n2 ∼io T2, which implies the second part of the theorem’s
claim.
Calling the sub-routine MaxLumping has three possible outcomes: (i) no mismatches (i.e. critical blocks) are found,
(ii) there is only one mismatch state on level n + 1, i.e. one of the two trees is higher, or (iii) there are two states s1
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and s2 in T1 and T2 respectively which are not bisimilar. If case (i) holds, then T1 and T2 are already bisimilar and the
algorithm terminates. So we prove the correctness of the algorithm in the other two cases.
k = 0. Since all states at layer 0 are leaves (there are no outgoing transitions), clearly, we have that T1|0 ∼tb T2|0,
and T 01 ∼io T1, and T 02 ∼io T2.
k → k + 1. In the general case (iii) the procedure FixIt is called which proceeds in two phases: In the first phase
the procedure constructs a common minimisation T mins1 and T
min
s2 of s1  T1|n and s2  T2|n with respect
to two non bisimilar states s1 and s2 at level n + 1. In the bisimulation relation constructed by calling
MaxLumping, the partition of the states in s1  T1|n and s2  T2|n is such that s1 ∼tb s2. However, by
Lemma 20 we have that after the common minimisation s1 and s2 are now bisimilar. As a result, the
number of non-bisimilar states at layer n + 1 is strictly reduced. We observe that case (ii) is the special
case of (iii) in which either s1 or s2 is a dummy state d and the transition to the n layer cut-off is labelled
by e. In phase two FixIt inserts subtrees S1 and S2 in T mins1 and T
min
s2 respectively. Since these subtrees are
constructed via the padding procedure on copies and depleted versions of subtrees S′1 and S′2 of T1 and T2
of height smaller than n, by the induction hypothesis they are time bisimilar. This guarantees that we still
have T ′1|n ∼tb T ′2|n, where T ′j |n, j = 1, 2, is the n layer cut-off after the insertion of subtrees S1 and S2.
Moreover, by Lemma 22 and Lemma 21 we have
O(T n+11 ) = O(T mins1 s1p1−min(p1,p2) S1)
= O(T1) − (p1 − min(p1, p2)) ·O(S1) + (p1 − min(p1, p2) ·O(S1))
= O(T1).
and similarly for T n+12 .
As we have only finitely many states in a layer we will eventually reach the situation where there are no non-
bisimilar states in layer n + 1 or more generally in the n + 1 cut-off. The algorithm therefore terminates in each
layer and as we also have only finitely many layers the algorithm terminates with T ′1 ∼tb T ′2, T ′1 ∼io T1, and T ′2 ∼io
T2. 
7. Comparisons and related work
7.1. Comparison with Agat’s transformation
In [2] Agat proposes a transformation technique in the context of a type system with security types. The type system,
besides detecting illegal information flow, transforms conditional statements that branch on high-security data into new
statements where both conditional branches have been made bisimilar, thus making the new statement immune to timing
attacks and the associated high-security data safe. The conditional statement is transformed by adding a ‘dummy copy’
of each branch to its counterpart such that, when the new branches are compared against each other, the original code is
matched against its dummy copy. If we adapt this technique to PTS’s and apply it to the processes A and B considered
before, we get the transformed processes shown below:
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According to Agat’s transformation, a ‘dummy execution’ of B should follow A and a ‘dummy execution’ of A
should precede B. Given that A has two final states, two dummy copies of B are appended to process A. Similarly, a
dummy copy of A is put before B. However, in order to preserve the tree structure of the process, a new copy of B is
made so it can be joined to one of the final states of the dummy copy of A.
Clearly the two transformed trees are time bisimilar and the new processes are I/O-equivalent to their original
versions. It is also clear that this transformation not only creates a greater number of states than our proposed solution
but, more importantly, generates processes with longer execution time.
7.2. Related literature
The work by Agat [2] is certainly the most closely related to ours; in fact we are not aware of other approaches to
closing timing leaks which exploit program transformation techniques. Apart from the basic differences between our
transformation algorithm and the Agat transformation type system explained in the previous section, our approach is
in some sense more abstract than [2] in that it does not address a specific language; rather it is in principle adaptable
to any probabilistic language whose semantics can be expressed in terms of our PTS model.
Timing attacks are prominently studied in security protocol analysis, and in general in the analysis of distributed
programs specifically designed to achieve secure communication over inherently insecure shared media such as the
Internet. In this setting, timing channels represent a serious threat as shown for example in [17] where a timing attack
is mounted on RSA encryption, and in [18] where it is shown how by measuring the time required by certain operation
a web site can learn information about the user’s past activities; or in [19] where an attack is described over Abadi’s
private authentication protocol [20].
The various approaches which have been proposed in the literature for the time analysis of security and cryptographic
protocols mainly exploit languages and tools based on formal methods (timed automata, model checkers and process
algebra). For example, [21] develop formal models and a timed automata based analysis for the Felten and Schneider’s
web privacy attack mentioned above. A process algebraic approach is adopted in [13] and [22] where the problem of
timing information leakage is modelled as a non-interference property capturing some time-dependent information
flows. A different approach is the one adopted in [23] where static analysis techniques are used to verify communication
protocols against timing attacks.
8. Conclusion and further work
In this paper we have investigated possible countermeasures against timing attacks in a process algebraic setting.
The aim is to transform systems such that their timing behaviour becomes indistinguishable – i.e. they become bisimilar
– while preserving their computational content – i.e. I/O behaviour. Our particular focus in this work was on finite,
tree-like, probabilistic systems and probabilistic bisimulation.
Simple obfuscation methods have been considered before, e.g. by Agat [2], which may lead to a substantial increase
of the (average) running time of the transformed processes. Our approach attempts to minimise this additional running
time overhead introduced by the transformation. The padding algorithm achieves this aim by patching time leaks
‘on demand’ whenever the lumping algorithm which aims to establish the bisimilarity of two processes encounters a
critical situation. Further work will be directed towards improving the padding algorithm further. At various stages
of the algorithm we make non-deterministic choices (of certain states or classes); it will be important to investigate
strategies to achieve optimal choices.
We also plan to investigate probabilistic and conditional padding. The current algorithm introduces time leak fixes
whenever they appear to be necessary. The resulting processes are therefore perfectly bisimilar. However, one could
also think of applying patches randomly or only if the expected time leak exceeds a certain threshold. One would
then obtain approximate or ε-bisimilar systems – in the sense of our previous work [7,1] – but could expect a smaller
increase of the (average) running time and/or the size of the system or program considered. Optimising the trade-off
between vulnerability against timing attacks – measured quantitatively by ε – and the additional costs – running time,
system size etc. – requires a better understanding of the relation between these different factors. To this aim we believe
we can exploit well established techniques and results from the fields of decision theory and non-linear optimisation.
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